Readers over the age of 50 will readily acknowledge the blessings of the modern GPS (global positioning system). Remember what it was like to fumble with paper maps while trying to steer a two-ton vehicle down the highway? Those maps never did fold back the way they came. And if the maps failed us, there was always the embarrassment of having to stop at a gas station or convenience store to ask for directions (I realize that men never, ever stopped!).
It was not uncommon to get lost—and lost often—before GPS entered our lives. On such occasions my father would often comment, “Well, it’s a nice day for a drive.”
Fast forward a few decades and we see the enormous impact GPS has had on our ability to get where we want to go. I find these systems indispensable, and as a frequent driver, I consider them to be among the best inventions of the past half century.
But as with any innovation, it’s not always smooth sailing. As this month’s Thought Leader, Lisa Dyer of the GPS Innovation Alliance, notes, there always seem to be folks out there wanting to ruin it for the rest of us. They may be criminal organizations looking to cover their tracks, foreign nations looking to disable their enemies’ systems, or simply bad actors seeking to disrupt the movement of goods and people. They do it through jamming and spoofing of the GPS signals.
For instance, the bad guys might jam a GPS signal by broadcasting different radio signals on the same frequency to overwhelm the legitimate GPS satellite transmissions, causing receivers to lose signal entirely. Widespread jamming has been reported in the Baltic Sea area, where thousands of aircraft have experienced navigation disruptions linked to geopolitical tensions in the region.
Spoofing is similar but can be more dangerous. It involves sending a false signal that is picked up as genuine by a receiver. In 2017, several ships in the Black Sea reported that spoofed signals showed them located at inland airports instead of out at sea. Similarly, there have been reports of spoofing of aircraft signals throughout the Middle East.
The good news is that things can be done to secure our global positioning and navigation systems. But it won’t happen overnight. As Dyer notes, our government first has to acknowledge that there is a potential threat. It then needs to work with other nations to address the problem on a global basis, assuring that new systems have needed safeguards, including authentication signals that can verify when signals are genuine.
As players in an industry that relies on accurate navigation, we need to recognize this threat and lobby for regulations to safeguard these critical systems.
