The Hydrogen Workshop Transit Agencies Actually Need

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On March 20, 2026 in Mississauga, Ontario, CUTRIC is hosting a hydrogen fuel cell bus readiness workshop sponsored by Mississauga’s transit agency, MiWay. The framing is straightforward. As Canada moves toward a greener future, agencies are invited to prepare for the arrival of hydrogen buses on site. The assumption is that hydrogen buses are coming and the task is readiness.

Michael Raynor and I had attempted to persuade MiWay and others that hydrogen buses represent a costly detour from the proven path of battery electric buses. Those efforts did not change direction. Instead, MiWay is sponsoring a workshop that continues the hydrogen trajectory. If hydrogen buses are proceeding regardless, then transit agencies need a different workshop. They need one focused on risk containment, fiscal protection, staffing strain, service reliability, and preserving momentum on battery electric deployment.

Battery electric buses now account for the vast majority of zero emission bus orders globally. BloombergNEF and the International Energy Agency both report that China alone has deployed more than 500,000 battery electric buses. Europe and North America continue to add thousands annually. Hydrogen fuel cell buses remain a small fraction of global fleets, and a declining percentage of new bus orders compared to battery electric.

The reason is partly structural. A battery electric bus converts roughly 75% to 85% of input electricity into motion at the wheels. Hydrogen produced by electrolysis converts electricity to hydrogen at about 65% efficiency. Compression, storage, and dispensing reduce that further to around 55%. The fuel cell converts hydrogen back to electricity at about 55%. The result is roughly 30% end to wheel efficiency. In simple math, it takes roughly 2.5 to 3 times as much electricity to move a hydrogen bus a kilometer as it does a battery electric bus. That gap translates into operating cost, infrastructure scale, and grid load. It does not disappear with optimism.

There are multiple other reasons why transit agencies looking at actual use cases choose not to go near hydrogen. A useful workshop would cover them from a risk and damage control perspective. With that in mind, I propose the following agenda for transit agencies that due to a long process, lobbying and bad governmental decisions have ended up about to prepare for hydrogen buses in their fleets.

8:15 to 8:30 — Framing the Situation

Suggested comments would be:

We are here because hydrogen buses are coming, whether we would have chosen them or not, and our responsibility is not to debate that decision today but to manage its consequences. Transit agencies exist to deliver reliable service at predictable cost, and hydrogen introduces operational, financial, and staffing complexities that must be addressed directly. This workshop is about protecting riders from service disruptions, protecting taxpayers from escalating exposure, and protecting our electrification trajectory by ensuring that hydrogen remains contained, accountable, and reversible if necessary. Our goal is disciplined risk management, not technology advocacy.

8:30 to 9:30 — Protecting Service Delivery Under Hydrogen Volatility

Hydrogen fleets introduce two recurring failure modes. Fueling station downtime and vehicle stack or compressor failures. Hydrogen buses depend on high pressure fueling infrastructure with compressors, storage banks, chillers, and safety systems. A single compressor failure can take an entire fueling station offline. In several European and North American deployments documented in transit agency reports and press coverage, buses were sidelined because the fueling station or hydrogen supplies were unavailable.

Hydrogen bus fleets have been fully sidelined by insufficiently pure hydrogen which damaged the fuel cell, requiring complete replacement that took months, if it occurred at all.

Agencies must model spare ratios accordingly. If a depot operates 100 buses and plans to convert 20 to hydrogen, it should not assume the same 15% spare ratio used for diesel or battery electric fleets. A 25% effective spare ratio for hydrogen units may be more realistic in early years. That means five of the 20 hydrogen buses are assumed offline at any given time. Critical trunk routes should not depend on hydrogen. Headway sensitive corridors and hospital routes should remain on diesel or battery electric until hydrogen uptime data demonstrates sustained reliability above 95%. Service protection is the primary mandate of transit. Hydrogen must be subordinate to that mandate.

Diesel buses considered for retirement should be kept and maintained as shadow fleets beyond their expected retirement to backfill for potential full fleet failures to preserve operations. While hydrogen bus climate benefits are usually significantly overstated, a diesel bus is still better than riders reverting to cars.

The EU’s JIVE program status report on hydrogen buses made it clear that manufacturers were not offering equivalent warranties, with 20 months seen for hydrogen buses compared to five years full parts and labor and eight year drivetrain warranties for electric buses, equivalent to diesel. Tenders and contracts must demand warranties equivalent to diesel for hydrogen buses as a mandatory requirement.

9:30 to 10:30 — Shielding Taxpayers from Escalating Costs

Hydrogen bus capital costs are typically US$1.2M to $1.5M per bus compared to $800,000 to $1M for battery electric buses depending on configuration. (All values are in USD to genericize this suggested workshop so that it’s useful more broadly.) A 20 bus hydrogen order can represent an incremental $6M to $10M over a comparable battery fleet. Infrastructure magnifies that. A hydrogen fueling station for 20 to 40 buses can cost $15M to $30M depending on storage capacity and redundancy. That translates to $375,000 to $1M per bus before a kilogram of hydrogen is dispensed.

Fuel costs are volatile. Gray hydrogen in North America has ranged from $3 to $6 per kg at wholesale in recent years. Green hydrogen contracts have stayed much higher, averaging over $9 per kg for manufacturing. Delivered and dispensed costs for transportation are at least $12 per kg. A hydrogen bus consumes roughly 8 to 10 kg per 100 km. At $10 per kg, fuel cost is $0.80 to $1 per km. A battery electric bus consuming 1.2 to 1.5 kWh per km at $0.15 per kWh costs $0.18 to $0.23 per km. Over 60,000 km per year, the fuel cost difference alone can reach $35,000 to $50,000 per bus annually.

Agencies must insist on fixed price contracts with clear price caps, performance based manufacturer payments tied to uptime above 95%, and decommissioning bonds that cover removal of hydrogen infrastructure at end of life. Hydrogen projects without sunset clauses risk becoming stranded assets that taxpayers absorb.

10:30 to 10:45 — Break and open discussion

10:45 to 11:45 — Infrastructure Containment and Depot Strategy

Hydrogen requires hazardous area classifications, ventilation, gas detection, and setback compliance. Permanent retrofits to existing garages can cost $10M to $25M depending on scale and building configuration. Winnipeg abandoned its hydrogen fleet plans in part due to escalating costs for retrofitting an existing garage.

Agencies should consider keeping hydrogen fueling and storage outdoors where feasible, minimizing permanent structural changes to garages designed for battery electric expansion. Temporary modular maintenance structures rated for hazardous environments can cost $1M to $3M. That is not trivial, but it is materially less than full building retrofits.

Permanent alterations reduce flexibility. Battery electric depots require electrical upgrades and charging infrastructure, but they do not require explosion classified bays or high pressure gas storage. Agencies must ask whether altering core facilities for a technology representing 10% to 20% of fleet share and a strong likelihood of early sunsetting is prudent.

11:45 to 12:30 — Fuel Supply Reality and Contractual Exposure

Most hydrogen produced in North America and Europe today comes from steam methane reforming of natural gas. That is gray hydrogen. Blue hydrogen with carbon capture reduces emissions but does not eliminate them. Green hydrogen from electrolysis powered by low carbon electricity remains limited in scale. In Ontario, small scale electrolysis pilots exist, but there is no evidence of large dedicated green hydrogen production sufficient to supply dozens of transit buses continuously.

A fleet of 20 hydrogen buses consuming 8 kg per 100 km and operating 60,000 km per year will require roughly 960,000 kg of hydrogen annually. Scaling to 100 buses requires nearly 5 million kg per year. Agencies must ask where that hydrogen is coming from and under what contract terms.

Hydrogen as a service shifts capital costs to a utility or third party provider, but it does not eliminate price volatility or supply risk. Fuel contracts should stress test price doubling scenarios. If hydrogen rises from $12 to $20 per kg, annual fuel cost per bus can exceed $150,000. Agencies are not energy traders. They must cap exposure with strong contractual language.

Remembering that this is a trial and hydrogen trials have ended prematurely around the world, hydrogen as a service contracts need offramp clauses so that the agency and city don’t have long term fiscal responsibilities for hydrogen that is no longer being consumed. Offload risk onto the hydrogen as a service provider.

12:30 to 1:00 Brief lunch and open discussion

1:00 to 1:45 — Organizational Strain: Staffing, Skills, and Operational Complexity

Running diesel, battery electric, and hydrogen fleets simultaneously increases complexity. Diesel mechanics are trained on internal combustion engines and fuel systems. Battery electric technicians require high voltage electrical training and battery management system diagnostics. Hydrogen introduces high pressure gas handling, fuel cell stack maintenance, compressor diagnostics, and hazardous gas safety certification.

Specialized hydrogen technicians are scarce. Training programs require weeks of instruction and certification refreshers. A depot that operates 200 buses and shifts 20 to hydrogen may need to dedicate a subset of maintenance staff exclusively to hydrogen due to safety protocols. That reduces staffing flexibility. Union classifications may require negotiation for new skill categories.

Training hydrogen technicians while scaling battery electric fleets competes for the same workforce. Agencies must quantify this load. If hydrogen maintenance requires one additional full time equivalent technician per 10 buses at $100,000 annual cost including benefits, a 20 bus hydrogen fleet adds $200,000 per year in labor. That does not include supervisory and safety oversight time. Hydrogen is not an incremental drivetrain. It is a separate industrial system layered onto existing operations.

The total number of technicians required is greater than for the same total number of buses with just diesel and battery electric drive trains. That introduces downstream staffing risks when the hydrogen trial ends, with staffing level commitments above what is needed and related long term fiscal responsibilities. Consider subcontracting for all bus maintenance to a third party organization so that they bear the costs and risks when the program ends, if unions concerns can be dealt with. Framing the hydrogen buses as a trial with external OEM maintenance provision for the first few years is a tactic to be explored.

1:45 to 2:30 — Protecting Battery Electric Momentum

The core decarbonization and operational cost reduction lever is scaling battery electric buses rapidly. Hydrogen cannot consume grid upgrade capital, procurement bandwidth, or political attention that slows BEV deployment. Agencies should commit to fixed BEV procurement targets regardless of hydrogen pilots. If an agency plans to electrify 50 buses per year with batteries, hydrogen projects must not reduce that to 30. Capital budgets should be separated. Training budgets should protect BEV scaling.

The efficiency math reinforces this priority. For every 1 MWh of electricity available, battery buses deliver roughly 0.75 MWh of motion at wheels. Hydrogen delivers about 0.3 MWh. When electricity supply is constrained, allocating it to hydrogen multiplies required generation capacity. That translates into more substations, more transmission upgrades, and higher system cost. Hydrogen should remain contained as a pilot, not as a co equal pathway. Make hydrogen grid upgrades for actually green hydrogen the hydrogen as a service provider’s problem.

2:30 to 2:45 — Break and open discussion

2:45 to 3:30 — Exit Strategy and Stranded Asset Planning

Agencies must plan for scenarios where hydrogen funding declines or costs escalate. If fuel costs double or a supplier exits the market, hydrogen buses may be parked, a situation that’s occurred globally. Converting hydrogen buses to battery electric is theoretically possible but economically challenging. A hydrogen bus chassis is not designed around large battery packs. Retrofit costs could exceed $500,000 per bus with uncertain performance.

Multiple OEMs who were delivering hydrogen buses and trucks have gone out of business in the past two years, leaving transit agencies and other fleet operators with unsupported fleets and escalating costs for support that is no longer covered by warranties. Plan for this contingency.

Secondary resale markets for hydrogen buses are nonexistent. Agencies should limit fleet size to maintain optionality. Insisting on OEM buyback clauses for hydrogen buses derisks this somewhat, but recognize the risk of OEM failure.

Infrastructure contracts should include decommissioning obligations borne by the provider, with bonds. If a $20M fueling station is decommissioned after 10 years, removal and remediation could cost several million dollars. Those liabilities must not default to taxpayers.

Any infrastructure that isn’t built or owned by the transit agency cannot be stranded. Any major capital changes to garages that are not performed cannot be stranded.

3:30 to 4:15 — Communications and Public Accountability

Hydrogen disruptions will occur. Fueling outages, fuel cell failures, delayed stack replacements, and cost overruns are documented in transit agency reports globally. Agencies should prepare disciplined messaging. Emphasize pilot status, learning objectives, and continued battery electric scaling. Lean into preserving optionality as a wise choice, even though considering hydrogen as an option is long past.

Avoid overpromising emission reductions without clarifying hydrogen sourcing. Transparency protects credibility. If hydrogen represents 10% of fleet but 40% of zero emission capital spending, that imbalance will attract scrutiny. Agencies must communicate that hydrogen is constrained, monitored, and financially bounded.

4:15 to 5:00 — Executive Synthesis and Risk Containment Framework

Hydrogen buses are technically viable but carry higher capital cost, lower energy efficiency, greater infrastructure complexity, and greater staffing load than battery electric buses. Transit agencies exist to deliver reliable service at reasonable cost.

If hydrogen proceeds, it must do so within strict guardrails. Limit fleet share. Protect BEV scaling. Cap fuel exposure. Avoid permanent depot alterations where possible. Demand performance guarantees. Require decommissioning bonds. Maintain spare ratios above standard planning levels. Quantify staffing impacts. Model worst case fuel prices. In short, manage hydrogen as a constrained experiment, not as an equal pillar of fleet strategy.

5:00 to 6:00 — Networking and open discussion

The day will be long because derisking hydrogen bus trials for riders, taxpayers, the transit agency and the city is non-trivial. Cities around the world are facing the collapse of the trials and left with barely used or unused hydrogen refueling stations, contracts that they are struggling to break and parked buses. They are not achieving any of the purported climate benefits, especially now that it’s clear that hydrogen is a potent, if indirect, greenhouse gas, interfering with the breakdown of methane in the atmosphere, and it leaks.

CUTRIC’s workshop in Mississauga is framed as readiness for hydrogen arrival. What transit agencies actually need is a workshop focused on containing the operational, fiscal, and organizational risk of hydrogen deployment. MiWay has already committed public funds and institutional capital to this pathway. Continuing to sponsor hydrogen enablement sessions without confronting the full scope of risk continues to divert time and money from the proven lever of battery electric scaling. If agencies are disciplined, they will not spend a day rehearsing readiness narratives. They will spend it building the risk management framework outlined above and accelerating battery electric buses onto routes as quickly as capital and grid upgrades allow.