Do It Yourself? Iran Begins Producing Its Own Airbus & Boeing Aircraft Parts

According to local news reports, Iran has begun producing its own parts for its airlines’ aircraft as it attempts to mitigate the impacts of Western sanctions. The Iranian aviation fleet is of considerable age, and the availability of spare parts for them is already limited. Over the years, sanctions have been imposed, lifted and imposed once more against Iran and its civil aviation industry, having a major impact on safety and overall operational performance.

Domestic aircraft parts

According to Iran’s Tasnim News, the country has begun manufacturing its own Airbus and Boeing aircraft parts. In an interview with the news agency, the country’s Civil Aviation Organisation Head, Hossein Pourfarzaneh, said the following:

“Given the issues of sanctions against Iran in the aviation industry, a plan was made to localize aircraft engine parts. Accordingly, with the cooperation of MAPNA, the process of reverse engineering and localization of Boeing and Airbus aircraft engine parts was implemented in the country over a 9-year period. In this way, Iran has been able to obtain the technology to manufacture important parts for the aviation industry.”

Pourfarzaneh was appointed to his current position in September.

Ch-aviation data shows that 158 Airbus and Boeing aircraft are registered in the country, across a variety of airlines. The summary table below shows more details.

As Simple Flying has reported previously, a country manufacturing its own spare parts for Western-made aircraft in the face of sanctions is not an entirely new phenomenon. In November 2023, we noted that Russia’s Aeroflot wanted to replicate parts to continue operating its Airbus and Boeing planes. More recently, it emerged that five cargo Boeing 737 aircraft were being purchased from lessors to be scrapped and used for spare parts for Aeroflot’s low-cost subsidiary Pobeda Airlines.

A brief history: Iran’s sanctions story over the last 15 years

On October 14, the Council of the European Union announced sanctions against three Iranian airlines in response to their transport of weapons in support of Russia’s war against Ukraine. This was not the first time that the bloc decided to impose sanctions on the aviation industry in Iran: prominently since the 1979 Iranian revolution, several international sanctions (whether comprehensive or targeted) have impacted the country’s aviation industry. Most recently, this included restrictive measures imposed by the UN Security Council in 2008 and 2010, ordering that Iran Air cargo aircraft be inspected by member states.

In July 2010, the European Union banned Iranian carriers from operating to EU airports, which was later lifted. In 2011, the United States unilaterally imposed economic sanctions on Iran Air, notably prohibiting the sale of spare parts and commercial aircraft itself and banning US companies from doing business with the carrier. It is worth noting that these sanctions have almost always had an impact on all Iranian airlines as well.

This was lifted in 2016 after the establishment of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) under President Barack Obama, also known as the Iran nuclear deal. This paved the way for aircraft orders by Iran Air, previously inaccessible as aircraft made up of more than 10% American parts required US approval- which Iran did not have. The 2011 sanctions meant Boeing planes were off the table, but also those manufactured by Europe’s Airbus due to the quota of American-made parts.

Iran Air placed an order with Boeing for 80 aircraft in December 2016, and with Airbus for 100 the same month (initially committed to in January). After three Airbus deliveries, the order was canceled as Iran Air was blacklisted once more in November 2018.

Reasons behind recent sanctions

Focusing on the recent cases, we can identify several targeted sanctions (imposed specifically on high-value targets for acting on behalf of the local government) -take the latest EU sanctions as an example- and to some extent, comprehensive sanctions as per the US case in 2011.

These concern the use of Iran’s aviation industry for means that support the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, sending soldiers in support of problematic regimes, as well as the hijacking of these airlines for use by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) for transporting weapons to countries that have violated international norms (such as Russia).

The primary objectives included limiting the military capabilities of either targeted or third-party countries with which the target deals, while secondary aims cover deterrence in all cases, dissuading other countries from hijacking their industries in the same way. They were unilateral in the US cases – with wide-ranging consequences including limiting possible Airbus aircraft orders in Europe- and regional in the EU case.

The humanitarian consequences of these sanctions

Looking at the consequences of these sanctions, there are several angles of analysis. Firstly, the recent sanctions have most certainly misfired, that is, they have had negative humanitarian side effects. A lack of access to Western parts due to US sanctions has meant that Iran’s aviation industry has had to make do with what it has. This could be through manufacturing its own spare parts or grounding aircraft indefinitely to use them for spare parts. Sanctions have also meant that the amount of qualified technical support for existing planes has dramatically decreased.

Several accidents have occurred over the last two decades, often with the primary or contributing factors cited as inadequate training, access to simulators (limited by sanctions), and poor maintenance of onboard systems. They have also somewhat backfired, allowing Iran to argue that the West is against the country’s development and in the US case is not standing by its commitments as part of the nuclear deal. It follows a certain discursive strategy by authoritarian regimes to counter sanctions through reference to the outsiders’ imperialism. It can also be a case of shooting in the foot as the aircraft deals for Boeing and Airbus were worth more than $40 billion at list prices, combined.

A difficult decision: why did the US sanction Iran’s aviation industry?

The Iran aviation industry case represents an example of selectivity issues with sanctions, especially when it came to the US’ measures in 2018. The first option for the US was to block the sales of aircraft completely (which it did) although this reinforces the aforementioned ideological debate portraying the US as not living up to its nuclear deal relief promises.

It also shows European countries that the US’ influence limits business for them, too (Airbus). The other option is to approve the deals while subtly imposing additional restrictions. This, however, would be met with loud complaints from Iran.

Foreign pressure therefore has an influence on sanctions cases, as explained through this example. It is particularly relevant in the aviation sector, as by imposing sanctions on an airline, you de facto limit the movement of people. In the EU’s latest sanctions, it claimed:

The Union does not intend to impede air traffic or people-to-people contacts between the Union and Iran in general.

Iran Air was forced to cancel its entire European operation – including flights to London. At the same time, it is true that one-stop flights (typically via Turkey) are also an option for those wishing to fly between Europe and Iran. Given operational challenges in the Middle East, Austrian has suspended its service from Vienna till February 2, while Lufthansa has done the same for its Frankfurt flight which will resume on February 1.